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Abstract 
We report the results of the first comparative study of the determinants and effects of patent oppositions 
in Europe and of re-examinations on corresponding patents issued in the United States. The analysis is 
based on a dataset consisting of matched EPO and US patents. Our analysis focuses on two broad 
technology categories - biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and computer software. 
Within these fields, we collect data on all EPO patents for which oppositions were filed at the EPO. We 
also construct a random sample of EPO patents with no opposition in these technologies. We match these 
EPO patents with the “equivalent” US patents covering the same invention in the United States. Using the 
matched sample of USPTO and EPO patents, we compare the determinants of opposition and of re-
examination. Our results indicate that valuable patents are more likely to be challenged in both 
jurisdictions. But the rate of opposition at the EPO is more than thirty times higher than the rate of re-
examination at the USPTO. Moreover, opposition leads to a revocation of the patent in about 41 percent 
of the cases, and to a restriction of the patent right in another 30 percent of the cases. Re-examination 
results in a cancellation of the patent right in only 12.2 percent of all cases. We also find that re-
examination is frequently initiated by the patentholders themselves. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, a series of administrative, judicial, and legislative actions strengthened 
the economic value of U.S. patents and extended their coverage in such areas as computer 
software and “business methods.” Although many of these actions were undertaken at the behest 
of the U.S. business community, concerns have been raised since the early 1990s about the 
potential economic burdens of low-quality patents in an environment of greater deference to the 
rights of the patentholder (Merges 1999; Barton 2000). A number of experts have suggested that 
the U.S. patent examination system does not impose a sufficiently rigorous review of patent and 
nonpatent prior art, resulting in the issue of patents of considerable breadth and insufficient 
quality. Many of these critics advocate the reform or extension of procedures that would enable 
interested parties other than USPTO examiners to bring relevant information to bear on this 
process either before or shortly after the issue of a patent. But much of this debate has occurred 
in an empirical vacuum. Little is known about the characteristics or effectiveness of existing 
procedures for such post-issue challenges within the U.S. patent system, and virtually no 
research has compared the characteristics or effects of U.S. post-issue challenge procedures with 
those available elsewhere in the industrialized world’s patent systems. 
 
At present the primary procedure for such a challenge to the validity of a U.S. patent is the “re-
examination” proceeding, which may be initiated by any party during the life of the patent. A 
more elaborate and adversarial procedure in the European Patent Office (EPO) is the opposition 
process. This paper uses new data in an exploratory comparative analysis of these post-issue 
challenge proceedings, pursuing two main questions:  
 
1)  What are the determinants of post-issue challenges to the validity of patents in the United 
States and Europe?
1 
2)  How do patents pertaining to the same invention fare in the two different systems?  
 
In answering these questions, we use data from both the European and the United States Patent 
Offices, including a newly created dataset of “twin” patents, that is, patents taken out in both 
jurisdictions on the same invention. 
 
The institutions that allow for post-grant challenges of patent validity differ considerably 
between the U.S. and Europe. An important feature of the proceedings at the European Patent 
Office (EPO), the significance of which has been remarked upon widely by practitioners but 
minimally analyzed, is the “opposition process.”
2 For nine months following the issue of a patent 
by the European Patent Office (EPO), interested parties can contest its validity by filing an 
opposition. Typically, opponents argue that an issued patent is invalid because it fails to meet the 
standard requirements of patentability (novelty, inventive step, industrial application, non-
                                                 
1   We use the terms European patents or opposition in Europe as short-hand descriptions for patent applications, 
grants, and challenges administered by/at the European Patent Office. Strictly speaking, a European patent (that 
is, a patent valid throughout Europe) does not exist, since patent rights are defined within the respective national 
law. Despite some harmonization, these laws are still heterogeneous. 
2   The opposition process at the EPO resembles the opposition process at the German Patent Office. The frequency 
of opposition is also quite similar.   3 
prejudicial disclosures) or the patent does not disclose the invention with sufficient clarity or 
completeness.
3 In response to an opposition, the EPO may reject the opposition, amend the 
patent, or revoke the patent entirely.
4 
 
Patents issued by the EPO designate the European states in which the applicants wish to patent 
their inventions. While the EPO application costs roughly three times more than the typical 
country application, because an EPO patent grants the applicant a right to patent in any 
designated state, the EPO process affords significant cost advantages for inventions requiring 
protection in a number of European markets. But the centralization of application and 
examination also allows a centralized legal challenge: under the European Patent Convention 
(EPC), any third party can use an opposition proceeding to challenge the granted patent within 
nine months after the granting date for all of the designated states, rather than having to pursue 
legal proceedings in each of the European nations designated in the patent. The EPO opposition 
process has been cited by Merges (1999) as a more effective means of ensuring “high quality” 
patents, especially in novel technological areas, than those available in the United States.  
 
U.S. patents are issued on the basis of criteria that are broadly similar to those employed by the 
EPO. The reliance by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on searches of “prior art” 
that are frequently confined to prior patents, however, means that in areas such as computer 
software or biotechnology, a lack of patent-based prior art can result in the issue of patents of 
dubious merit or quality. Furthermore, for examiner searches made in the non-patent prior art, 
novel technologies create higher search costs that can pose added barriers to effective discovery 
of prior disclosures. If prior disclosures are missed by the examiner, interested third-parties 
wishing to challenge a U.S. patent post-issue have two options: (1) Challenge the patent in 
federal court; or (2) Request a “re-examination” of the patent by the USPTO. In absolute terms, 
patent litigation has grown significantly in the United States during the period from 1985 to 
2000, although the rate of litigation relative to the number of issued patents has remained 
constant. But, as we suggest below, litigation is a costly and time-consuming means for 
establishing the validity and/or claims of a patent. In addition, costly patent litigation may 
contribute to growth in “defensive” patenting, another resource-intensive process with limited 
social returns (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).  
 
The patent re-examination procedure was created by federal legislation during the 1980s.
5 The 
number of annual re-examination requests grew from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, but 
has scarcely grown since 1994. Unlike litigation or oppositions, the re-examination process is not 
an adversarial proceeding in which advocates for each side introduce evidence and arguments in 
support of their position, and there are limits on the types of issues that can be raised within a re-
examination. Moreover, Merges (1999) points out that the requirement that any opposition be 
                                                 
3   Article 100 EPC 
4   Article 102 EPC 
5   An alternative re-examination procedure, the interpartes  re-examination, was enacted by the United States 
Congress in 1999. See the American Inventors Protection Act, codified in 35 USC 311-318. Several 
commentators have questioned the efficacy of the interpartes re-examination on grounds that it allows the third-
party requestor limited opportunities of involvement, prevents any adverse findings of the USPTO from being 
appealed to the courts, and also precludes the raising of any questions of validity on grounds that were, or may 
have, been raised during the interpartes  re-examination from being litigated in the courts (Neifield 2000). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the procedure has been little used in practice.   4 
filed within nine months of the issue of an EPO patent means that the validity of EPO patents is 
determined at a much earlier point in their term than is true of the re-examination or litigation 
processes.
6 Merges estimates that almost 7% of EPO patents trigger opposition proceedings, 
while only 0.3% of U.S. patents result in re-examination requests.
7 In addition, oppositions result 
in much higher rates of patent revocation than do re-examinations. According to Merges, more 
than 34% of oppositions filed in 1995 resulted in the revocation of the relevant EPO patent, 
considerably higher than the 12% of re-examination requests producing a similar result in U.S. 
patents during this period.
8  
 
In this paper, we report the results of the first comparative study of the determinants and 
outcomes of patent oppositions in Europe and of re-examinations on corresponding patents 
issued in the United States. Our analysis focuses on two broad technology categories - 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors and computer software.
9 Within these 
fields, we collected data on all EPO patents for which oppositions were filed at the EPO. We 
then constructed a random sample of EPO patents in these technology classes that triggered no 
opposition proceedings. We matched these EPO patents with the “equivalent” USPTO patents 
covering the same invention in the United States. This approach allows us to compare the post-
issue quality control processes for technologically identical patents. Using the sample of matched 
USPTO and EPO patents, we compare the determinants of either opposition or re-examination. 
 
We explore issues related to the first main topic of the paper by addressing the following 
questions: 
 
1.  How does the rate of opposition (number of oppositions/all issued patents) vary by patent 
class within the EPO data, and similarly for USPTO re-examinations? Which EPO and 
USPTO patent classes exhibit the highest opposition and re-examination rates, 
respectively? 
 
2.  What are the outcomes of the opposition and the re-examination processes? Do the two 
procedures consistently lead to a large number of patent revocations or amendments? Do 
types of outcomes differ significantly with the characteristics of the patent or 
characteristics of the patent owner or the challenger? For example, is there any evidence 
                                                 
6   Balanced against this is the fact that EPO patents take longer to issue than U.S. patents, so the median lag 
between patent application and opposition challenge is in fact longer than the median re-examination lag in our 
data (see Table 1). 
7   Some of this difference in challenge rates may be due to the limited 9-month window available under EPO 
opposition rules: due to uncertainty over the competitive threat posed by the new property right, challengers in 
Europe may be forced to purchase a challenge option by filing within the first 9 months after patent issue. In the 
US, conversely, challengers are permitted to observe the development of the competitive landscape and 
technological trajectory, only filing a challenge when the threat justifies the added costs. 
8   See Merges (1999), pp. 612-614. Our data focus on selected technical fields and show similar numbers: we find 
a slightly lower opposition rate over the whole period 1980-1999 and a higher revocation rate, once the results of 
appeals are taken into account. 
9   The IPC classes included were A61K (except A61K/7), C07G, C12M, C12N, C12P, and C12Q 
(biotechnology/pharmaceutical) and G01R, G06F, G06K, G11C, H01L, H03F, H03K, H03M, and H04L 
(semiconductors/computers/software).   5 
suggesting that patents owned by “independent inventors” are more likely to be 
challenged than patents owned by corporations?
10 
 
3.  How do the lengths of the average opposition re-examination processes compare? What 
is the total time lag between application date and resolution of legal disagreements? Do 
oppositions, for example, enable a faster resolution of issues of patent quality and/or 
validity? 
 
Using our matched sample of patents, we address the second main topic (see above) by 
investigating the following questions: 
 
1.  Do EPO oppositions and US re-examinations focus on relatively “important” patents, 
measured in terms of citations to these patents in subsequent patents? How do the US 
patents that match opposed EPO patents compare to the US control sample (equivalents 
to unopposed EPO patents) in terms of the number of post-issue citations?  
 
2.  Do we observe significant differences in the probability that a US patent corresponding to 
an EPO patent for which an opposition is filed will be challenged through a re-
examination request or through litigation, by comparison with patents in the U.S. “control 
samples”? 
 
More broadly, we wish to use this preliminary analysis as one component of an assessment of the 
comparative cost and efficiency of the re-examination and opposition processes, including a 
comparison of the costs, outcomes, and duration of these processes with those of litigation. This 
more ambitious goal is beyond the scope of the current paper because of the lack of US and 
European litigation data. Nevertheless, the results reported here provide a useful starting point 
for the broader analysis. 
 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
At present, the U.S. and European patent systems have similar aims and requirements for 
patentability, but differ in the allowable subject matter and in their administrative procedures. In 
this and the next section of the paper, we provide a brief overview of the operations of the two 
systems. 
 
                                                 
10 The U.S. re-examination process was altered considerably during Congressional consideration in response to 
pressure from the “independent inventor” community within the United States, and there is some reason to 
believe that any effort to strengthen the re-examination process or institute an opposition proceeding would 
encounter considerable opposition from this group. Much of the group’s opposition to such changes stems from 
the belief by many independent inventors that stronger re-examination or opposition proceedings would 
significantly raise the costs of patenting, because of the added costs of defending patents within these 
proceedings. Accordingly, information on the incidence of re-examination and opposition proceedings among 
different classes of patentholders will shed light on the likelihood that a disproportionate share of any such 
increased costs would be borne by the independent inventor.   6 
In the United States, an invention (“process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter”) 
must satisfy four requirements to be patentable: adequate disclosure, novelty, usefulness, and 
non-obviousness. In Europe, firms and individuals have been able, since 1978, to submit a single 
application to the European Patent Office that specifies up to 24 national jurisdictions
11 where 
they desire patent protection for an invention. Under the EPO regime, the patentability 
requirements—adequate disclosure, novelty, industrial application, and inventive step—are 
broadly similar but not identical to those of the United States. The last two, “industrial 
application” and “inventive step,” map roughly onto the U.S. requirements of “usefulness” and 
“non-obviousness,” respectively. 
 
Figure 1 shows a rough timeline covering the period between patent application and grant in the 
two systems. During the period covered by our dataset, the U.S. patent application was kept 
secret until the patent issued, which meant that the median time between application and 
publication was 18 months to two years, with a long tail. As part of the patent system 
harmonization legislated in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, the U.S. instituted a 
policy of publication 18 months after application in November 2000 for many patents with 
applications pending in jurisdictions outside the United States.
12 In contrast, EPO applications 
have always been published with an 18-month lag, regardless of whether they have issued. 
 
Both systems have a post-grant procedure through which the validity of the patent can be 
challenged by other parties, but the two patent systems’ post-grant challenge procedures differ 
significantly. In both systems, interested parties can also bring suit in court over infringement 
and validity (with some restrictions as to when a suit can be filed). We discuss these 
administrative processes for post-grant challenges in the following section. 
 
3. THE ADIMISTRATIVE PROCESSES AT THE USPTO AND EPO 
 
3.1 USPTO Examination and Re-Examination Procedures 
 
In the United States, inventors may claim a utility patent
13 by making application to the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Before a patent issues, the USPTO is charged 
with ensuring that the invention is adequately specified,
14 covers patentable subject matter,
15 is 
                                                 
11 Including: Austria, Greece (Hellenic Republic), Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Monaco, Spain, Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic. 
12   The American Inventors Protection Act (1999) requires publication of all applications after 18 months but 
excepts applicants opting to make a declaration that a patent will not be sought in a foreign jurisdiction requiring 
18 month publication. 35 USC §122. 
13   While the vast majority of US patents--and the focus in this paper--are the so-called Utility patents authorized by 
35 USC §101, patents are also available on Plants (35 USC §161) and Designs (35 USC §171). 
14   35 USC §112. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 US 62 (1854)(finding that a claim to all uses of electromagnetic waves 
did not adequately describe these uses). 
15   35 USC §101. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980)(determining that man-made living micro-




18 Procedurally, the application must be filed within one year 
of the invention's public use or publication,
19 contain an adequate description with one or more 
claims,
20 and be accompanied by the payment of a fee.
21 
 
The USPTO patent examiner is the arbiter of the patentability, novelty, usefulness, and non-
obviousness requirements cited above, judging these standards against the "prior art," i.e., prior 
inventions, in the field. Prosecution of the patent has been characterized as a "give-and-take-
affair," with negotiation and re-negotiation between the patentee and the examiner that ordinarily 
continues for 2-3 years (Merges, et al., 1997). The costs of prosecuting a patent through the 




Reexamination, originally envisioned as an alternative to expensive and time-consuming 
litigation, was created by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.
23 The legislative history of this Act suggests 
that the reexamination was intended to be a mechanism that would be less expensive and less 
time-consuming
24 than litigation. During the legislative process, however, the Act
25 was purged 
of its intended adversarial characteristics, reducing the usefulness of the procedure for opponents 
of a given patent. 
 
Procedurally, the reexamination proceeding permits the patent owner or any other party to notify 
the USPTO and request that the grounds upon which the patent was originally issued be 
                                                 
16   35 USC §101. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 US 519 (1966)(upholding examiner's determination that a the output 
of a chemical process was not useful if merely similar to a useful compound). 
17  35 USC §101, 102. See Jamesbury v. Litton Industrial, 756 F.2d 1556 (CAFC 1985)(finding that an invention 
was "novel" when no prior art was precisely equivalent). 
18   35 USC §103. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US 1 (1966)(finding an invention invalid on grounds that the 
improvement would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art). 
19   35 USC §102(b).  
20   35 USC §112. Adequate description properly consists of four statutory requirements: enablement, written 
description, definite claims, and best mode. The "enablement" requirement is intended to allow any person 
skilled in the art to either make or use the invention. See Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg., 351 F.2d 546, 
(7th Cir. 1965) (holding that withholding information from claims failed to adequately describe the invention). 
The closely-related “written description” requirement ensures that the invention is actually described. See 
Permutit v. Graver Corp., 284 US 52 (1931) (finding the absence of any writing an insufficient description). The 
“definite claim” requirement ensures that the boundaries of the patent right is clearly marked. See Halliburton 
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 326 US 1 (1946) (finding overbroad and indefinite claims invalid). The “best 
mode” requirement is intended to ensure that the applicant discloses the most effective method known. See 
Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries, 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that a failure to disclose the only 
known mode violates the best mode requirement). 
21   USPTO regulations set the basic filing fee at $710 for utility patents. 37 CFR §1.16(a). Additional claims may 
raise the fees payable, and all fees are generally lower for "small entities." . 37 CFR §1.16(b),(c),(d). 
22   Gable and Montague (2001), although it is likely that most patent prosecution cost less than $10,000. Exclusive 
of variable costs, e.g., attorney time and search, the USPTO has set utility patent issue fees at $1,240. 37 CFR 
§1.18(a). 
23   Public Law 96-517 (12/12/80).  
24   Our evidence suggests that the average reexamination takes less than two years, slightly shorter than the average 
duration of a patent lawsuit (31 months). But this difference is not large (especially in view of the high variance 
of the “average duration” estimate for a trial), some observers have criticized the reexamination system for not 
having provided a fast and cheap alternative to trial.  
25   "Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws," Pub.L.No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).   8 
reconsidered by an examiner. Initiation of a reexamination requires that some previously 
undisclosed “new” and relevant piece of prior art be presented to the agency. Under the statute, a 
relevant disclosure must be printed in either a prior patent or prior publication—no other source 
can serve as grounds for the reexamination. 
 
After being initiated by the proponent through a notification and the payment of a fee to the 
USPTO,
26 the reexamination goes forward only if the Patent Office finds a "substantial new 
question of patentability."
27 Such a determination was intended by lawmakers to prevent the re-
opening of issues deemed settled in the original examination (Merges, 1997). The Patent Office 
must make this determination within 3 months of the request, and, having made the 
determination, must notify the patent owner.  
 
When the owner is not the reexamination proponent, the patentee is allowed to file a response to 
the newly discovered prior art within 2 months. If the owner chooses to respond, the requester is 
afforded an opportunity to reply within 2 months. By choosing not to respond, the owner can 
limit the requester’s participation in the process. The reexamination is thus designed to be an ex 
parte proceeding between the patent owner and the Patent Office, with limited opportunities for 
third-party involvement.  
 
Any third party, such as a competitor or other opponent of the patent, thus has a limited role in 
the re-examination process. The requester is entitled to notify the USPTO of the triggering “prior 
art,” to receive a copy of the patentee’s reply to the reexamination (if any), and to file a response 
to that reply. The owner’s role in the process is much more involved: the reexamination statute 
contemplates a second examination, with the same type of “give and take” negotiation between 
owner and patent office which occurs during the initial issuance of a patent. The examiner 
remains the final arbiter of the process and it is not uncommon for the original examiner to be 
assigned the follow-up reexamination, thus putting the question of whether prior art was 
overlooked in the hands of the same government official responsible for ensuring that no prior 
art was overlooked in the previous search. 
 
Once the reexamination goes forward, however, the statute requires that the Commissioner make 
a validity determination.
28 The original patent is afforded no statutory presumption of validity in 
the proceeding, although the practice of assigning reexaminations to the original examiner may 
produce such a de facto presumption. The reexamination may be neither abandoned nor 
postponed awaiting the result of concurrent litigation proceedings.
29 The result of the 
reexamination may be a cancellation of either all or some of the claims, or the confirmation of all 
or some of the claims. Nothing in the reexamination procedure can expand the scope of the 
original patent’s claims, but claims may be amended or new claims added during the 
renegotiation between the patent owner and the examiner. 
 
In summary, for parties seeking to invalidate an issued patent, the reexamination procedure 
involves considerable costs and risks. The filing fee for the reexamination is not insubstantial, 
                                                 
26   $2,520 in 2001. 37 CFR §1.20(c). 
27   35 USC §303.  
28   35 USC §307. There is no time limit on the duration of a reexamination per se. 
29   Although reexaminations may be stayed during other USPTO proceedings, including reissue or interferences.   9 
and practitioners estimate the average costs of a reexamination costs at $10,000-$100,000 
depending upon the complexity of the matter. Although the costs of a re-examination are lower 
than litigation ($1 - 3 million), the third-party challenger in re-examination is denied a 
meaningful role in the process, and the patentholder maintains communications with the 
examining officer, offering amendments or adding new claims during the reexamination. 
Reexamination may also impose additional costs upon challengers seeking redress in court 
because juries tend to give added weight to reexamined patents, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has indicated that claims confirmed by the reexamining officer present, in 
practice, added barriers to a successful contest.
30 As a result, challengers face powerful 
incentives to forego reexamination in favor of litigation, a process that may well be more 
expensive, more time-consuming, and less expert for testing post-issue validity. 
 
3.2 Patent Litigation in the United States 
 
In the United States, post-issue validity can also be tested in court. The U.S. federal courts 
obviously are a unified system operating under the same substantive legal requirements, in 
contrast to the multi-state system facing litigants in Europe. Because patent suits are filed at the 
district court (trial) level, litigants have considerable control, e.g., through their choice of district 
court, over the manner in which litigation unfolds. This opportunity for control is partially 
mitigated by the existence of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all patent 
appeals. But a very small percentage of patent cases are appealed to the CAFC, which means that 




Procedurally, litigation differs markedly from the reexamination procedure. Unlike the 
reexamination procedure, litigation is an adversarial appeal to a court-arbiter in which the litigant 
has a choice over the final arbiter of the dispute, and may elect to have the case heard by either a 
judge or a jury. Because patent suits generally arise from a charge of infringement by the patent 




Legal standards create a relatively hostile environment in the Federal Courts for challengers 
seeking to invalidate an issued patent. Under the statute, patents are “born valid,” enjoying a 
strong presumption of validity during the court proceedings.
33 Furthermore, the evidentiary 
standard for proving a claim invalid is “clear and convincing” evidence, a standard considerably 
higher than the mere “preponderance” of proof required in the typical civil suit. Because judges 
and juries may have limited technical expertise, these presumptions and evidentiary barriers 
create high costs for challengers. The pro-patent environment signaled by the creation of the 
                                                 
30  Kaufman Company v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970 (CAFC, 1986) (suggesting that evidentiary burdens are likely 
higher for challengers post reexamination). 
31   Although it is likely true that more valuable patents are more likely to be the subject of an appealed trial verdict. 
32  This owner-initiation occurs in many cases in which declaratory validity determinations are being sought by a 
challenger-3
rd party: these suits which make the patentee the defendant are often initiated only after a demand by 
the patent holder to the challenger to stop infringing the patent, thus putting the initial move in the hands of the 
patent holder. 
33   35 USC §282.    10 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has compounded these barriers: according to one study, 
successful challenges to patent validity fell from 50% to 33% in the years after the creation of 
the Court (Lemley and Allison, 1997). 
 
Direct costs in litigation are also high compared to reexamination. Estimates of legal costs in 
patent litigation run from $1-3 million per suit (AIPLA, 1999) to $500,000 per claim at issue, per 
side (Barton, 2000). One important driver of these costs is the extensive use of pre-trial 
discovery. The lag between filing a patent suit and reaching a resolution can also be 
considerable: one study estimates the average length of a district court patent suit at 31 months 
(Magrab, 1993). These relatively high costs and long lags have led a number of scholars (e.g., 
Merges, 1999) to argue that a stronger post-grant challenge system could reduce uncertainty 
regarding the validity of individual patents and, arguably, contribute to higher patent quality, in a 
less expensive and time-consuming manner. As we noted earlier, the adversarial elements 
originally contained in the legislation that established the U.S. re-examination system were 
largely removed this procedure during Congressional debate of the bill. In contrast, adversarial 
processes form the basis for the “opposition” procedure adopted by the European Patent Office. 
 
3.3 EPO Examination and Opposition Procedures
34 
 
Patent protection for European member states can be obtained by filing several national 
applications at the respective national patent offices or by filing one EPO patent application at 
the European Patent Office. The EPO application designates the EPC
35 member states for which 
patent protection is requested. The total cost of a European patent amounts to approximately 
€29,800, roughly three times as much as a typical national application.
36 Thus, if patent 
protection is sought for more than three designated states, the application for a European patent 
is less expensive than independent applications in several jurisdictions. This cost advantage has 
made the European filing path particularly attractive for applicants selling goods and services in 
multiple European markets. Increases in the number of patent applications and grants have given 
the European Patent Office a level of economic importance that now resembles to that of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
 
EPO patent grants are issued for inventions that are novel, mark an inventive step, are 
commercially applicable, and are not excluded from patentability for other reasons.
37 After the 
filing of an EPO application, a search report is made available by the EPO to the applicant. The 
search report is generated by EPO’s search office in The Hague and then transferred to the 
examining staff in the Munich office. The search report describes the state of prior art regarded 
                                                 
34  This section is largely based on the description of the EPO examination and opposition system in Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2001). 
35  The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, also referred to here as the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) was enacted in October of 1973. It is the legal foundation for the establishment of the EPO. The full text 
of the convention is available at http://www3.european-patent-office.org/dwld/epc/epc_2000.pdf.  
36  As in other patent systems, the official patent office fees are a relatively small part of the costs (in this case 
€4,300). Professional representation before the EPO amounts to €5,500 on average, while translation into the 
languages of eight contracting states requires €11,500. Renewal fees for a patent maintained for ten years 
amount to roughly €8,500. See “Cost of an average European patent as at 1.7.99“, http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/new/kosten_e.pdf (Jan. 14, 2002). 
37  See Article 52 EPC.   11 
as relevant according to EPO guidelines for the patentability of the invention, i.e., it contains a 
list of references to prior patents and/or non-patent sources.
38 Within six months after the 
announcement of the publication of the search report in the EP Bulletin, applicants can request 
the examination of their application. This request is a compulsory prerequisite for the patent 
grant. If examination is not requested, the patent application is deemed to be withdrawn. 
Eighteen months after the priority date the patent application is published. At this point, the 
application is normally under examination; thus, the patent owner is generally required to reveal 
some information about his/her invention prior to the grant of the patent even if no patent is ever 
issued. 
 
After examination (if requested) has been performed, the EPO presents an examination report. At 
this point, the EPO either informs the applicant that the patent will be granted as specified in the 
original application or requires the applicant to agree to changes in the application that are 
necessary to grant the patent. In the latter case, a negotiation process similar to that in the US 
system may ensue. Once the applicant and EPO have agreed concerning the scope of the 
allowable subject matter, the patent issues for the designated states and is translated into the 
relevant national languages. If the EPO declines to grant a patent, the applicant may file an 
appeal.
39 On average, the issue of a European patent takes about 4.2 years from the date of filing 
the application (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2001). Within nine months after the patent has been 
granted, any third party can oppose the European patent centrally at the European Patent Office 
by filing an opposition against the granting decision. The outcome of the opposition procedure is 
binding for all designated states. If opposition is not filed within nine months after the grant, the 
patent’s validity can only be challenged under the legal rules of the respective designated 
countries, some of which have their own opposition proceedings.  
 
The EPO opposition procedure thus is the only centralized challenge process for European 
patents. An opposition to a European patent is filed with the EPO. The opponent has to 
substantiate his opposition by presenting evidence that the prerequisites for patentability were 
not fulfilled, e.g., the opponent must show that the invention lacked novelty and/or an inventive 
step, or that the disclosure was poor or insufficient. At the EPO, an opposition division 
determines the outcome. The examiner who granted the patent is a member of the three-person 
opposition chamber, but may not be the chairperson. The opposition procedure can have one of 
three outcomes: the patent may be upheld without amendments, it may be amended,
40 or it may 
be revoked.




                                                 
38   It is important to note that applicants at the EPO are not required to supply a full list of prior art – as it is the case 
in the US system. See Michel and Bettels (2001, 191f.). 
39  See Article 106 EPC. Any decisions made by the EPO receiving, examining, opposition sections and legal 
division can be appealed and the appeal has suspensive effect. 
40   See Article 99ff EPC. An amendment normally results in a reduction of the “breadth” of the patent by altering 
the claims which define the area for which exclusive rights are sought. 
41  On average, the opposition procedure takes around 2.2 years if the patent is revoked and about 4 years if the 
patent is amended. See Table 2 for similar information on our samples. 
42   See EPO (1999), p. 17 and Merges (1999), pp. 612-614. There are no publicly available data as to the frequency 
and extent of amendments, or the frequency of rejected oppositions. For the technical fields considered in this 
paper, we compute these figures below.   12 
Another interesting aspect of the opposition procedure concerns the restrictions imposed by this 
process on the opponent’s ability to settle “out of court”. Once an opposition is filed, the EPO 
can choose to pursue the case on its own, even if the opposition is withdrawn.
43 Thus, the 
opponent and patentholder may not be free to settle their case outside of the EPO opposition 
process once the opposition is filed. This provision of the opposition proceeding may discourage 
its use by opponents seeking to force patentholders to license their patents. 
 
Both the patentholder(s) and the opponent(s) may appeal the outcome of the opposition 
procedure.
44 The appeal must be filed within two months after receipt of the decision of the 
opposition division, and it must be substantiated within an additional two months. The Board of 
Appeal affords the final opportunity at the EPO to test the validity of the contested European 
patent. Both parties can bring expert witnesses into the proceedings, and there are various 
options for having deadlines extended. For the two technical fields considered in this paper, the 
median duration of the challenge procedures (opposition and any appeal
45) is 3.07 years, 
although there is considerable variation in the duration of individual cases (the interquartile 
range is 2.8 years).  
 
The official fee for filing an opposition is €613; for filing an appeal against the outcome of 
opposition, the fee is €1022. But the total costs to an opponent or the patentholder are much 
higher. Estimates by patent attorneys of the costs of an opposition range between €15,000 and 
€25,000 for each party. Patent attorneys interviewed by us agreed that there is not much room for 
the opponent to drive up the patent owner’s cost of litigation, since attorney fees are regulated in 
most European countries, including Germany, where many patent lawyers who have the required 
EPO registration reside. 
 
 
3.4 Patent Litigation in Europe 
 
Although the EPO provides a centralized application and examination process, there is no supra-
national or centralized process of patent litigation in Europe. The attractiveness of the EPO 
opposition process stems in part from the fragmentation of patent litigation processes in Europe. 
Unfortunately there have been very few systematic studies of patent litigation within the various 
European nations. We therefore confine ourselves to a brief review of the few facts that are 
known. 
 
After the grant, the EPO patent becomes a bundle of national patent rights that are treated like 
“normal” national patents that can be attacked by third parties through legal means allowed for in 
the respective national legislation. Outcomes in these “local” litigation cases are restricted to the 
“local” level, e.g., the patent may be invalidated in Spain, but this does not affect its validity in 
Italy. During the past decade, national patent courts have increasingly taken evidence and 
decisions from litigation in other EC nations into account, but no systematic study has analyzed 
                                                 
43   Rule 60 EPC: “In the event of the death or legal incapacity of an opponent, the opposition proceedings may be 
continued by the European Patent Office of its own motion, even without the participation of the heirs or legal 
representatives. The same shall apply when the opposition is withdrawn.” 
44   Article 99ff. EPC 
45 For the two technical fields studied in this paper, an appeal occurs in about one third of all opposition cases.   13 
such legal “spillover” effects (Stauder 1996). Other spillover effects link the outcome of 
oppositions and those of subsequent litigation. The national authorities involved in the 
adjudication of these suits can refer to previous proceedings, which may make it more difficult 
for a plaintiff to win a national validity suit after having lost an EPO opposition proceeding. But 
no systematic analysis of these spillovers has yet been undertaken.  
 
The differences among national jurisdictions within Europe are enormous, requiring substantial 
investments in each national suit and driving up the costs of challenging the national patents 
emerging from an EPO grant in several of the designated states. The costs of litigation in any 
national court have been estimated to be between €50,000 and €500,000, depending on the 
complexity of the case. This cost structure makes an attack at the European level using the 
opposition procedure particularly attractive for a current or potential competitor of the 
patentholder. The litigation rate (computed as the number of cases for which a suit is filed 
divided by the number of patents) in most European countries is roughly one percent, slightly 
lower than in the United States (Stauder 1996, 1989). But the quantitative evidence is too sparse 
to conclude from these figures that the existence of the opposition mechanism leads to a 
reduction in litigation. 
 
4. Extent and Determinants of Post-Issue Challenges 
4.1 Aggregate Statistics 
 
This section presents some aggregate statistics on EPO patent oppositions and USPTO re-
examinations during the past two decades. First we look at the rate at which these post-grant 
challenges are pursued for all granted patents and for our two broad technology classes. We then 
analyze the length of time until challenge occurs and until it is resolved. Finally, we examine the 
characteristics of patents that influence the frequency of post-grant challenges in our two 
technology classes.  
 
Any comparison of opposition and re-examination must begin with a recognition of the fact that 
there are far more opposition cases (33,599 between 1980 and 1998) than re-examination cases 
(2,949) during the period of this analysis. This difference reflects the fact that the re-examination 
proceeding operates very differently than does an opposition proceeding. Indeed, one salient 
difference between the re-examination and opposition procedures concerns the identity of the 
challengers in these processes. In nearly 44% of the re-examination cases during this period, the 
party initiating the proceeding is identified by USPTO as the patent’s “owner.” Obviously, there 
are virtually no circumstances under which the patentholder initiates an opposition proceeding in 
the EPO. Moreover, since many of the other parties initiating re-examinations are law firms that 
may be acting on behalf of patentholders, the share of re-examinations initiated by patentholders 
almost certainly approaches 50%. In many cases, patentholders initiate re-examinations to 
address failures to properly cite prior art, correct claims, or to repair other flaws in the issued 
patent. But this difference between re-examinations and oppositions in the identity of the 
initiating parties highlights the very different roles of the re-examination and opposition 
procedures and underscores the need for caution in drawing analogies between these types of 
post-issue challenges.  
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Because our technology classes contain relatively few re-examination cases, much of our 
discussion of re-examinations in this section uses data for all U.S. re-examinations, rather than 
only those from our two broad technology classes. Figure 2 displays the opposition and re-
examination “rates” in all technology sectors during 1980-98 (based on the year of patent grant), 
while Figure 3 shows the rates for our two technology classes during 1980-96. The opposition 
and re-examination “rate” is defined as the share of patents granted in a given year that are 
ultimately challenged through opposition or re-examination. Our measure of the re-examination 
rate is truncated because challenges can happen any time during the lifetime of a patent,
46 and we 
use a simple model of the re-examination lag to compute a minor correction for this truncation. 
Two facts are immediately apparent from Figures 2 and 3: 
1.  The opposition rate at the EPO is much higher than the re-examination rate at the USPTO 
for all technology classes (Figure 2), as has been noted previously by Merges (1999) and 
Harhoff and Reitzig (2001). The average re-examination rate during the 1981-1998 
period was 0.2% and the average opposition rate during the period was 8.3%. Thus, 
during 1980-98 oppositions were about 40 times more likely to be filed than re-
examinations. 
2.  The opposition rate for patents in the semiconductors, computing, and software sector is 
substantially lower than that for patents in the biotechnology/pharmaceutical sector and 
for patents in all sectors. Our two technology classes display far smaller differences in 
their re-examination rates, nor do their re-examination rates differ significantly from 
those for patents in other sectors. The lower opposition rates in semiconductors and 
software may reflect technological differences, but it is also plausible that firms in the 
semiconductor and computing industries have developed a pattern of private negotiations 
(e.g., cross-licensing negotiations) for resolution of some emerging disputes 
(Hall/Ziedonis 2001). The relatively modest inter-class differences in re-examination 
rates reflect the limited utility of this process for use by patent opponents or competitors. 
 
Figure 4 displays the distribution of the average lag between applying for a patent and the filing 
of a re-examination or opposition request.
47 Because oppositions must be filed within 9 months 
of a patent grant, its lag distribution is much tighter than that for re-examinations. But the grant 
lag in Europe is longer, making the mean lag between application and the filing of an opposition 
or re-examination action similar for the two proceedings: 5.5 years elapse between the 
application date and initiation of an EPO opposition, only slightly less than the average lag of 6 
years between patent application and a re-examination request in the United States.  
 
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of the time lag between a patent application and final resolution 
of the post-grant challenge in the two systems. Since prompt resolution of uncertainty over 
patent validity is one potential source of welfare gain from an efficient system for post-issue 
challenges, the length of time from patent application to final resolution is an important criterion 
for evaluating the respective benefits of oppositions and re-examinations. The distributions of the 
                                                 
46  Figure 4 depicts the distribution of the lag between patent application and challenge. Roughly three-fourths of 
the re-exam requests are filed within 8 years of the application date. Since the average pendency period for a US 
patent application is 2 years, this lag corresponds to approximately 6 years after the grant date.  
47  With the exception of the data in Figure 2, the EPO data are based on all oppositions in our two selected 
technology classes, a sample of approximately 2400 oppositions filed between 1980 and 1999.    15 
duration of these proceedings differ considerably, and it is clear that the European opposition 
system takes somewhat longer to resolve patent disputes. The median length of time between 
application and final outcome of the challenge proceeding is 8.4 years at the EPO and 6.4 years 
at the USPTO. Confining our analysis to patents applied for before 1991, in order to minimize 
the effects of lag truncation, reduces the difference between these means, reflecting the more 
diffuse distribution of these lags at the USPTO. Nevertheless, the duration of the period from 




Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the lag distributions that were shown in Figure 5 for 
the two systems. The median lag between patent application date and final opposition outcome at 
the EPO is two years greater than for re-examination at the USPTO for the overall time period, 
although this differential lag shrinks to less than one year for pre-1991 applications. The 
interquartile range is slightly more than one year smaller within the EPO data for the entire time 
period and more than two years smaller for pre-1991 applications. The EPO opposition 
proceedings thus are longer on average, but the variance of these lags is greater within the US re-
examination proceedings. Since the re-examinations can be initiated at any time during the life of 
a US patent, this greater variance in the distribution of the “procedural lags” for US re-
examinations is hardly surprising. 
 
The Appendix to this paper presents two brief case studies of USPTO and EPO patents covering 
similar inventions that were opposed in the EPO system (in our terminology, these are “twin” 
patents). The cases, both of which cover biomedical inventions, indicate that parties opposing 
patents in the EPO may well pursue litigation simultaneously against the EPO patentholder’s US 
patent. The cases also underscore the point made earlier about the lengthy duration of the EPO 
opposition system—one lawsuit in the United States over Ortho Pharmaceuticals ‘799 patent was 
settled five years before the opposition proceeding on the corresponding EPO patent reached a 
conclusion. The other U.S. lawsuit involving this patent, however, was not settled for two years 
after the conclusion of the opposition process for the EPO “twin.” The other case study of the 
Liposome Corporation’s U.S. and EPO patents reveals a similarly complex interaction between 
the processes of post-grant review or litigation in the U.S. and European systems. In this case, as 
in the Ortho Pharmaceuticals case, a defendant in an infringement suit filed in the U.S. by 
Liposome Corporation was engaged as an opponent to the Liposome Corporation’s EPO patent. 
This case also highlights the strategic use by a patentholder of the U.S. re-examination process to 
(apparently) strengthen its claims and weaken the position of a competitor. The cases thus 
indicate considerable interdependence between the EPO opposition process and post-grant 
challenges in the United States. The dimensions and timing of this interdependence are an 
important topic for future research. 
 
Summarizing our descriptive findings, the EPO opposition system does not reach a conclusion 
more rapidly than the US re-examination procedure, when this procedural duration is estimated 
as the length of time from patent application date to final resolution. The average lag between 
application date and the initiation of a challenge is substantially greater within the U.S. re-
                                                 
48 The lag effect may be exacerbated over time in the US system, particularly in certain sectors. In biotechnology, 
for instance, there is evidence that application pendency has been increasing through the 1990s (Wright, 1997) 
and that this effect may have been evident prior to our 1991 cutoff (Rader, 1990).    16 
examinations than in the EPO oppositions, but this difference reflects the different time limits on 
the initiation of such proceedings (the EPO requirement that opposition be filed within 9 months 
of patent grant). Should we conclude from these comparative data that the longer lags in the EPO 
opposition system imply a lengthier period of uncertainty, legal expense, and therefore, a higher 
welfare burden within the innovation systems of these economies? Such a conclusion is 
unfounded, since it relies on a characterization of the re-examination and opposition proceedings 
as analogous in their characteristics, rigor, and outcomes. The data presented above on the 
identity of the parties initiating re-examinations, as well as the abundant evidence discussed 
earlier of significant procedural differences between the re-examination and opposition 
processes, should dispel any such analogies. Any such comparison of challenges also must 
incorporate data on the next stages of these challenges, which in both Europe and the United 




4.2 Analyzing the Determinants of Re-Examination at the USPTO 
 
What are the characteristics of the U.S. patents that undergo re-examination? Do they differ from 
the characteristics that have been identified as determinants of EPO opposition challenges in the 
study by Harhoff and Reitzig (2001)? To address these questions, we analyzed the characteristics 
of re-examined patents by analyzing patents issued between 1975 and 1999 in all patent classes 
for which re-examinations were requested between 1975 and 1999 (a total of 3,078 patents), 
comparing the characteristics of these patents against those in a 1% sample of all U.S. patents 
issued during this period (yielding a “control sample” of 23,444 patents). In order to deal with 
truncation issues, we also analyzed a sample of pre-1991 patents from each system (a sample 
including 2058 re-examined patents and 12,160 control patents).  
 
The results for our probit regressions analyzing the determinants of re-examinations of all U.S. 
patents, which use variables similar to those used by Harhoff and Reitzig (2001), are shown in 
Table 2. The first panel shows results for the whole 1975-1999 sample, while the second panel 
restricts the sample to patents granted before 1991, because our measure of forward citations 
(those during the first 9 years of patent life) is truncated for patents issued in the 1990s. The 
variables have fairly high predictive value, with a pseudo R-squared of about 0.15 and an error 
rate of about 13-17% compared to 23% for random assignment.  
 
Similarly to the findings of Harhoff and Reitzig in their analysis of oppositions, we find that re-
examination requests are more likely for patents that are cited more frequently by other patents 
following their issue. Patents owned by individual inventors are no more likely to be re-
examined than those held by corporations. Patents held by government entities are about 8-11 
percent less likely to be reexamined, ceteris paribus.  
 
As we noted earlier, our data include re-examinations in all technology classes, in contrast to the 
analysis of oppositions by Harhoff and Reitzig. Our analysis of re-examinations of patents in the 
classes examined by Harhoff and Reitzig indicates that biotechnology/pharmaceutical patents are 
no more likely to be re-examined and patents in the semiconductor, computer hardware and   17 
software classes are less likely to be re-examined, by comparison with patents overall.
49 For 
patents granted prior to 1991, both biotechnology/pharmaceuticals and semiconductor/computer 
hardware have re-examination rates that are approximately the same as those for other industries. 
Only software is lower, by about 8 percent, although sample sizes are small. 
 
The nationality of the patentholder has little effect on the likelihood of re-examination, although 
patents held by U.S., Canadian, Australian, or Israeli assignees are slightly more likely to be re-
examined. Finally, the results for dummy variables indicating the number of claims in the patent 
suggest that the probability of re-examination rises monotonically with the number of claims; 
more complex patents are more likely to be re-examined.  
 
4.3 Re-examination Outcomes 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of re-examinations conducted by the USPTO between 1980 and 
1999. The top panel shows all 3127 re-examinations for which we have outcome information and 
the bottom panel shows the results for our two main technology classes.
50 The proportions are 
similar, although claim amendment appears to be more likely than the mere addition or 
cancellation of claims in our two technology classes, both of which cover relatively new areas of 
inventive activity.  
 
About 24 per cent of the patents are confirmed in full on re-examination, while only about 10 
percent are revoked in full, a number similar to the 12 percent reported by Merges (1999) for 
1995. For the newer technologies, confirmation in full is less likely and revocation more likely. 
The next section compares the results of re-examination to those achieved by the EPO opposition 
system for these two technology classes. 
 
4.4 Sampling Strategy for US-EPO Equivalents 
 
Thus far, we have examined data on the determinants of re-examinations at the USPTO. We now 
examine the similarities and differences between the US and European challenge systems, both 
in terms of the characteristics of patents that trigger challenges and in terms of the outcomes of 
these challenges. This analysis requires that we control for possible differences between US and 
EPO patents. To that end, we assembled a dataset that includes “twins,” i.e., EPO patents that are 
also issued in the United States or vice versa. 
 
Assembling this dataset of “twin” patents relied on a sampling strategy that could produce a set 
of US-EPO “twins” and control samples that are similarly distributed among years and 
technology classes within the U.S. and EPO patent data. We used the International Patent 
Classifications for our patents, since it is employed by both the USPTO and the EPO. We based 
our sampling strategy on the IPC classifications done at the European Patent Office, since these 
                                                 
49   Looking at the detailed classes, the following are less likely to be re-examined: C12P (fermentation or enzyme-
using processes), G06F (electronic digital processing), and H01L (semiconductor devices). More likely to be re-
examined are H03K (electronic switching (pulse) devices), G11C (static information storage), and H03F 
(amplifiers).  
50 The sample of outcomes is slightly larger than the sample of re-examinations used in Table 2 because a few 
observations were deleted from the sample used in Table 2 due to missing data problems.   18 
assignments are more reliable than the IPC assignments done after the fact at the USPTO.
51 We 
began by drawing a sample of approximately 2,000 EPO patents that met the following criteria 
(Figure 6 provides a graphic depiction of this sampling strategy): 
•  They were granted between 1980 and 1997 (applied for between 1978 and 1995).  
•  They were classified in one of our two broad technology classes (62% in 
biotechnology/pharmaceuticals and 38% in semiconductors/computers/software). 
•  An opposition was filed against them after grant. 
 
These patents are shown in the upper left hand corner of Figure 6. Using these 2,027 patents as 
our sampling frame, we then drew an 8% sample of unopposed EPO patents in these technology 
classes to use as controls in our analysis of oppositions, stratifying on the filing date (month and 
year) and IPC class, yielding a total of 2,861 patents. These are shown in the upper right hand 
corner. Because biotech/pharma patents are opposed at a higher rate, our 8% sample of 
unopposed patents yields a smaller control sample.
52 
 
U.S. equivalents for these two samples of patents (Equivalents are members of the same patent 
family which have exactly the same priority or priorities in common) were then collected, 
yielding the patents in the two bottom panels.
53 In about 2-3 percent of the cases, an EPO patent 
has more than one U.S. equivalent; three patents have more than 3 US equivalents.
54 The 
likelihood that an EPO patent has a USPTO equivalent is higher for semiconductor/software 
than for biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. We have no definitive explanation for this 
difference at present. It may reflect a greater tendency for patent applicants to pursue national 
rather than global IP protection strategies in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, or it may 
reflect a greater presence of non-industrial assignees (universities and government laboratories, 
both of whom are less likely to pursue global filings) in the biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
patent databases. But these possibilities are purely speculative, and additional analysis of our 
data is needed. 
 
The probability that an EPO patent has a U.S. equivalent is also higher for the controls than for 
the opposed patents, even when we control for broad technology class. It is possible that this 
result reflects interdependence between the EPO oppositions and patent filings in the US 
                                                 
51 This conclusion is based on private communications from more than one U.S. Patent Examiner. The search 
system at the USPTO is based on the U.S. patent classification system and IPCs are assigned only after the fact, 
based on a rough concordance. 
52   16 patents in the EPO opposed sample and 3 in the control sample described in Section 4 had twins that 
encountered re-examination requests, implying re-exam probabilities of 1.6% and 0.15% respectively. This 
means the re-exam probability is ten times as high for opposed patents, but still very small overall.  
53   See  http://gb.espacenet.com/espacenet/gb/en/help/161.htm for definitions of patent families and equivalents. 
Equivalents can be identified using the ESPACENET service of the European Patent Office. This database is 
available at http://ep.espacenet.com. 
54   This may result because the US and EPO standards for the patenting of embodiments differ, the USPTO 
permitting a larger number of applications than the EPO’s Unity of Invention standard would allow. Article 82 
of the European Patent Convention states "The European patent application shall relate to one invention only or 
to a group of inventions so linked as to form a single general inventive concept." This international distinction 
would tend to be exacerbated in the case of pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents, however, the applicants 
for which have long been recognized to pursue of strategy of “serial patenting” (Merges, 1997).    19 
system. For example, an applicant collecting information—either through patent issue or ex 
parte discussions with the examiner—that the USPTO patent is likely to be relatively “weak” 
may be less likely to pursue a “strong” EPO patent, simply because of the nonzero probability 
that an opposition to the EPO patent could result in the revocation or significant amendment of 
the EPO patent. But this issue requires additional analysis.  
 
 
4.5 Incidence of Opposition 
 
Table 4 displays the results of a series of probit regressions that relate the probability that a 
patent is opposed in the EPO system to the characteristics of the patent, its assignee, and the U.S. 
twin, if there is one. All of the right-hand variables are dummies and the estimates shown are the 
change in the probability if the dummy changes from 0 to 1. The first data column of the table 
gives the number of observations for each variable for which its respective dummy variable was 
equal to one. 
 
When we included only grant year dummies, the biotech/pharma dummy, and the U.S. twin 
dummy in the probit, we obtained the following estimate: 
 
Prob(opposition) = year effects + 0.290 D(biopharm) – 0.117 D(U.S. twin exists) 
                           (0.015)            (0.016) 
 
This result essentially summarizes the results of our sampling strategy: biotechnology/pharma 
patents are 30 per cent more likely to be opposed, and patents with U.S. twins are approximately 
12 per cent less likely to be opposed. Including only these variables along with grant year 
dummies yielded an R-squared of 0.09. 
 
Columns (1) and (2) relate opposition to a number of characteristics of the patent and its holder. 
In column (2) we replace the biotech/pharma dummy by a full set of dummies for the 15 4-digit 
IPC classes we are considering. These dummies are clearly significant (χ
2(12) = 99.5), but they 
have little effect on the estimate of the other coefficients.
55 The other variables in the regression 
are the following:  
•  A set of dummies for the number of EPO citations received by the patent between its issue 
date and 1999. One additional forward cite raises the opposition probability about 3-5 per 
cent, with some diminishing returns, a result that is consistent with the Harhoff-Reitzig 
results cited earlier. 
•  A set of dummies for the number of EPO states in which the patent was taken out (1-5, 6-
10, and more than 10). Designating more states raises the probability of opposition, which 
again is consistent with Harhoff and Reitzig (2001).  
                                                 
55  The degrees of freedom are lowered by the fact that some cells are sparse and therefore not identified in the 
regression. Those that had much lower opposition probability than average were G06F, G11C, H01L, H03K, 
H03M, and H04L, which are most of the semiconductor/computing classes. Those that were higher were C07G 
and C12M. This result essentially confirms the fact that the biopharm dummy captures most of the difference in 
opposition rates for these technologies.   20 
•  A set of dummies for the number of claims (1-5, 6-9, 10, 11-15, more than 15). Having 
more claims raises the probability of opposition, but only if the number of claims exceeds 
10.
56 The meaning of this result is ambiguous, because the number of claims in a patent is 
itself subject to multiple interpretations. On the one hand, patents with a large number of 
claims could be seeking protection for a very narrowly defined invention. In other words, 
these patents are occupying a space in a relatively “crowded” field populated by many 
similar inventions, raising the probability of an opposition. On the other hand, patents with 
large numbers of claims may be broader, rather than narrower, and may therefore face a 
lower probability of opposition (i.e., they could be early occupants of a less crowded 
invention space). The coefficient implies that the “crowding” effect, which raises the 
probability of an opposition, becomes significant as the number of claims in the patent 
exceeds 10. 
•  Whether the patentholder is an independent inventor,
57 a dummy variable for which the 
coefficient is insignificant. 
•  Whether an accelerated search was requested by the patent applicant at the EPO, which 
lowers the probability of opposition by about 14 per cent.
58 Accelerated search is often 
requested when the applicant is unsure of the state of the art, or of whether their invention 
is patentable. We therefore interpret this result as indicating a relatively “low-quality” (or 
less important) patent that is less likely to trigger an opposition.
59 
•  Whether an accelerated examination was requested by the patent applicant, which raises 
the probability of opposition by 24 per cent. This request indicates that the applicant 
attaches high value to the patent, e.g., because a patent race is underway. As a result, it is 
more likely that there will be a competitor that wishes to oppose the patent. 
•  Filing a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application, something that enables the applicant 
to file for protection later in up to 80 countries at WIPO. A PCT application raises the 
probability of an opposition by about 10-12 per cent, which may reflect the higher value of 
an invention for which broad international patent protection is sought.  The PCT also 
allows strategic delay:  a PCT filing gives a patentee up to 30 months in which to make a 
patent application in a foreign jurisdiction.  A PCT filing motivated by such delay would 
also likely reflect a patent of higher value.  
•  A set of dummies for the country of the patentholder. Although they are jointly significant, 
none are significant individually. Since those for Germany and the rest of Western Europe 
are marginally significant, we retain them. 
                                                 
56   The focal point at 10 claims is apparently caused by the fact that EPO charges a separate claims fee of €40 for 
the eleventh and each subsequent claim (Rule 31, 51 and 101 EPC). 
57   This variable disagrees with the U.S. assignment code for the twin in about one third of the cases, which seems 
unlikely to us. Some of the differences occur because the EPO records multiple owners for the same patent, both 
individual and corporate, where the USPTO records only the corporation (or university, in many of these cases). 
We include both the US and the EPO independent inventor variable in the regression in order to cover all 
possibilities.  
58   We are grateful to Markus Reitzig for suggesting inclusion of this and the next two variables. A detailed 
assessment of their usefulness for assessing the value of patent rights is given in Reitzig (2002). 
59  Accelerated searches may be pursued in the case of commercial necessity, i.e., an applicant’s need for a quick 
patent. In such a circumstance, we can determine no reason why opposition rates would be lower, and indeed 
these rates might be expected to be higher.   21 
•  A dummy for the presence of one or more U.S. twins. Once we control for other patent 
characteristics, the relative probability that a patent with a twin is opposed increases 
slightly, from minus 12 per cent to minus 9 per cent. This finding is puzzling and requires 
further analysis. We speculate that this result may once again reflect some interdependence 
between the information an applicant collects regarding the “weakness” of the USPTO 
patent and the perceived “strength” or quality of the “twin” EPO patent. The EPO “twins” 
of patents that are survive USPTO review may be viewed as stronger by potential 
opponents, and therefore are less likely to trigger an opposition. Obviously, this speculative 
interpretation requires additional analysis of the timing of filings and oppositions in the US 
and EPO systems. 
In general the results from the regressions in columns (1) and (2) confirm the findings in Harhoff 
and Reitzig (2001) that variables positively correlated with the value of a patent increase the 
probability that the patent will be subject to opposition. It is suggestive that patents held by 
independent inventors are no more likely to be opposed than other patents, other things equal. If 
we do not control for patent characteristics, however, patents held by independent inventors are 
11 per cent more likely to be opposed; the main reason seems to be that they are more likely to 
be biotechnology/pharmaceutical patents. This result may reflect the greater presence of 
European university inventions within the biotech/pharma patent class, ownership of many of 
which remains with the individual faculty member. 
Column (3) presents our preferred specification. Eliminating the insignificant variables does not 
affect the remaining coefficient estimates substantially. Patents held by German and West 
European assignees are about 7-9 per cent more likely to be opposed than patents held by 
residents of other countries. We explored the identity of the opposers, finding that they are more 
likely to come from countries that share a language with Germany or are in close proximity to a 
country that does. This suggests that the opposition system is more heavily used by those who 
are familiar with the language and culture of the country in which it is operated. It is natural 
therefore that the opposed patents also come from nearby countries, either because the (potential) 
opposers are more informed about them, or simply because they are more likely to be in the same 
narrow line of business. On the other hand, this finding may be caused by the choice of 
designated states for patent coverage, with Germany being the most favored choice. Inventors 
and corporations in European countries for which patent protection is not sought will have lower 
incentives to challenge patents that are not valid in their home country.  
Finally, in column (4), we add the following variables concerning any U.S. twins for these 
patents: 
•  Whether the patent has more than one U.S. twin, a variable that is insignificant. 
•  A set of dummies for the number of USPTO citations received by the patent in the first ten 
years of its life. One additional forward cite of this type raises opposition probability 1 per 
cent, with some diminishing returns at high citation levels. The slightly lower coefficient 
for US citations relative to EPO citations may reflect the fact that USPTO patents have 
many more citations per patent than EPO patents. Although the EPO citation variables fall 
slightly in the presence of USPTO citation variables, both enter the equation significantly. 
•  A set of dummies for the number of claims in the U. S. patent (1-5, 6-9, 10, 11-15, more 
than 15). Unlike citations, these variables are not significant in the presence of the dummy 
variable for the number of claims in the EPO patent application. When we exclude the   22 
dummies for EPO claims, the dummies for the U.S. claims become slightly significant and 
negative. This result may well reflect the difficulty, noted earlier, of interpreting the 
meaning of the number of claims in a patent. 
•  Whether the U.S. application date was prior to the EPO application date. This reduces the 
probability of opposition by about 4 per cent, possibly reflecting the fact that more of the 
value of these patents relies on their exploitation in the U.S. market, making opposition in 
Europe less important. But the finding also is consistent with the “signaling” interpretation 
of U.S. patent issue that was noted earlier. 
•  Whether the USPTO coded the inventor as an independent inventor. This increases the 
probability by about 8 per cent, but the coefficient is insignificant. Measuring this more 
accurately is of some concern, given the reluctance of the US independent inventor 
community to embrace an opposition system.
60 Controlling for grant year and nothing else, 
the raw difference in probability is 9.4 per cent with a standard error of 4.8 per cent.  
The set of variables that describe the U.S. twin are jointly significant, with a χ
2(11) = 42.6. 
Adding them has little effect on the other coefficients, beyond a reduction in the size of the 
coefficient for the “U.S. twin” dummy to minus 14 per cent. 
 
4.6 Opposition Outcomes 
 
The outcomes of the oppositions for our sample are shown in Table 5. The category “opposition 
closed” refers to cases in which the patentholders do not renew patent protection after the 
opposition has been filed, which causes the patent to lapse into the public domain. Thus, these 
cases will mostly reflect a successful challenge of the patent’s validity. Two facts are particularly 
striking: first, oppositions against patents with U.S. equivalents are more likely to be rejected. 
This may be due to the fact that patents from non-European applicants are selected carefully for 
patenting in Europe and are therefore more robust against the opposition challenge. It is also 
consistent with the argument that USPTO review does have a “quality-enhancing” effect on the 
issued patent. This result may also be a plausible explanation for the previously discussed 
negative impact of the “twin status” variable on the likelihood of opposition. 
 
Second, the probability of outright revocation of a patent subjected to opposition is much higher 
than for re-examination: a total of 35.1 percent of the patents are revoked, not counting the 
opposition cases that are closed because the patent lapses (recall that only 9-11% of re-examined 
US patents are revoked in full). Presumably, these results reflect the wider grounds allowed for 
opposition and the presence of a third party in the opposition process.  
 
Table 6 explores the relationship between patent characteristics and outcomes using a simple 
logit model of the following form: 
 
Pj = Pr(outcome j|Xi) = exp(Xiβj)/Σexp(Xiβk) 
 
                                                 
60   As we indicated earlier, there are many cases for which the U.S. variable is coded as unassigned that are 
currently (and perhaps, erroneously) included in the independent inventor class. In EPO applications, the listing 
of the applicant and of the inventors is compulsory.   23 
Where j = outcome of the opposition (still pending, rejected, amended, closed, or revoked) and Xi 
are various characteristics of the ith patent. In Table 6 we show the change in probability of each 
outcome type induced by a one-unit change in the right hand side dummy variable, holding all 
other variables constant: 
 
ΔPj (ΔXi
l= 1) = Pj[βj
l - Σ βk
lexp(Xiβk)/ Σ exp(Xiβk)] 
 
where l indexes the right hand side variables. All effects are measured relative to the opposition 
pending outcome, so the rows in Table 6 sum to zero.  
 
The results in Table 6 support the following conclusions: 
1.  Oppositions to patents with more citations or wider European coverage, or where there are 
multiple oppositions or multiple U.S. twins, tend to take longer to resolve.  
2.  Oppositions to biotech/pharma patents and/or highly cited patents, or where there are 
many claims, tend to result in amendment rather than a simple yes or no decision. 
Amendment is less likely when there are multiple oppositions or the inventor is an 
individual. More important patents or patents in relatively new, dynamic areas of 
inventive activity appear on this evidence to be more likely to be amended rather than 
revoked in an opposition. 
3.  Amendment is also more likely when an accelerated examination was requested for the 
patent. Recall that accelerated examinations are associated with a 25 percent higher 
probability of opposition in the first place. The two facts together suggest that these 
patents are in relatively new areas that are characterized by higher uncertainty about the 
technology, prior art, novelty, etc.  
4.  Revocation is more likely when there are multiple oppositions or few claims and 
substantially less likely when the patent is in the biotech/pharma area, when the patent is 
heavily cited by subsequent patents, when an accelerated search was requested, or when 
there are US twins.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS 
 
The determinants and characteristics of patent-challenge procedures are an important issue in any 
assessment of the U.S. or other industrial economies’ intellectual property systems. In a 
“knowledge-based” economy, intellectual property systems are constantly challenged by the 
advance of technology, a process that among other things creates new artifacts to which the 
necessarily backward-looking patent system must respond. A “knowledge-based” economy also 
is one in which the high political salience of national and global intellectual property systems 
means that they are the focus of political lobbying to strengthen, adapt, or weaken specific 
features of intellectual property regulation, administration, and law in order to favor particular 
interests. Both of these forces have been at work within the US intellectual property system 
during the past quarter-century, a period of significant strengthening of patentholder rights has 
triggered a debate over the appropriate level and limits of such rights. Moreover, this debate has 
important trans-Atlantic and global echoes and analogues. 
 
This paper has explored one dimension of the operations of the post-issue systems for 
challenging patent validity in the US and European intellectual property systems. The analysis 
presented here is preliminary and many issues remain open for further research. One of the most 
important gaps in our current data is the lack at present of data on rates of litigation for US 
patents that are re-examined and EPO patents (and their US “twins”) that are opposed. The lack 
of these data prevents us from examining whether the use of oppositions results in lower rates of 
litigation, lowering costs and resolving uncertainty more rapidly. Any such conclusion requires 
that we extend the analysis to incorporate post-challenge litigation, which we hope to do in 
future research. 
 
Nonetheless, the analysis in this paper (which itself needs to be extended to cover a broader array 
of patent classes and to incorporate the length and costs of litigation in the United States and 
Europe) highlights several interesting features of the patent-challenge systems of the US and 
EPO systems. First, the US re-examination procedure differs dramatically from the EPO 
opposition procedure in virtually all of its features. Perhaps the most significant of these 
contrasts is the identity of the party requesting a re-examination, which our data indicate is the 
patent owner in more than 40% of the cases. This characteristic of re-examination hardly 
qualifies it as the sort of adversarial procedure that EPO oppositions represent. With this fact in 
mind, comparisons of US re-examinations and EPO opposition proceedings must be treated with 
great caution.  
 
Keeping in mind the significant differences between the re-examination and opposition 
processes, our comparative analysis suggests that EPO oppositions do not resolve validity 
challenges more quickly than the USPTO re-examination proceedings. In other words (and 
keeping in mind the incomplete nature of our data), for any given patent the EPO opposition 
process does not resolve uncertainties over the quality and breadth of patents more rapidly than 
the re-examination process. Indeed, opposition proceedings in some cases (and almost certainly, 
in important, complex cases with numerous opponents, appeals, etc.) may well take as much time 
to be resolved as litigation in the US system. Nonetheless, the higher frequency of opposition 
(which is presumably due to the lower cost associated with opposition as compared to the cost of   25 
litigation in the US) within the EPO system is at least consistent with the hypothesis that the 
opposition process handles many more legal disputes over patent validity than are addressed by 
the U.S. re-examination process. 
 
Our analysis also indicates that patent amendment, rather than revocation, is more likely for 
oppositions in relative new fields of inventive activity, for more “complex” patents, or for 
oppositions in which numerous opponents participate. Since we lack evidence on the extent to 
which oppositions are followed by litigation in the European patent system, we cannot determine 
whether the lack of any “speed advantage” for oppositions in resolving patent disputes quickly is 
offset by a reduction of litigation rates associated with oppositions. The EPO system may offer 
few advantages over the U.S. system for post-issue patent challenges, but we cannot address this 
issue without analyzing litigation data for both the U.S. and European systems Any 
comprehensive assessment of the social costs and benefits of the two challenge systems requires 
that we consider both the “patent office” processes of post-grant challenge (opposition or re-
examination) and litigation. 
 
The analysis of EPO oppositions and USPTO re-examinations also indicates that more 
“valuable” or technologically important patents, based on the usual indicators of such 
characteristics, are more likely to trigger challenges. This conclusion is consistent with prior 
research, and if the private and social values of patent rights are correlated, higher levels of 
scrutiny for more important or valuable patents are welfare-enhancing. Misspecifications of the 
claims or other characteristics of important patents are likely to produce relatively large welfare 
losses, e.g., deviations from an optimal trade-off between market power allocated to the patent 
owner and incentives for R&D (Harhoff and Reitzig 2001).  
 
Our analysis of “twin patents” also suggests a complex interdependence between the probability 
of an EPO challenge and the issuance of a US “twin” patent. This interdependence must be 
explored further, but at least some evidence is consistent with the interpretation that “twin status” 
reflects selection issues that we have not addressed in this paper. There also appear to be some 
interesting issues of the timing of applications and issue of USPTO and EPO patents within these 
data, and we intend to analyze these issues in greater detail. The existence of such 
interdependence is hardly surprising in an integrated global economy, but these linkages have 
received little scrutiny from scholars of intellectual property policy. 
 
The heading for this section thus is used advisedly, since we have raised as many questions as 
conclusions in this analysis. But this highlights the richness of the agenda for further research. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Liposome Corporation – Patent No. 4,880,635 (EPO Publ. No. 190,315) 
 
In July 1985, the Liposome Corporation (LC) submitted an application in the US Patent and Trademark 
office for a patent on their "Dehydrated liposome" innovation, enabling the use of liposomes--fatty 
bubbles--that can carry drugs and cause the medication to concentrate at the site of an infection. Within a 
month, the firm had submitted an application at the European Patent Office to secure patent rights in 
Europe. The European application was published in August 1986, based upon Liposome’s claimed 
international priority date of August 1984. 
 
After pending in the Patent Office for 4 years and 4 months, the US patent issued on November 14, 1989 
(patent number 4,880,635), with 9 claims. During the next several years, LC began distributing its drug 
Abelcet, an anti-fungal treatment used for AIDS-related infections and based on its '635 patent. Rival 
Nexstar, Incorporated (formerly known as Vestar) developed a competing liposomal drug AmBisome, 
prompting LC to notify Nexstar that it believed the anti-fungal AmBisome infringed its patent. On May 
17, 1993, Nexstar sued LC in the Federal District Court in Delaware, seeking a declaration that the '635 
patent was invalid, and LC counterclaimed, charging AmBisome with infringement. 
 
Presented with new prior art that created some likelihood that Nexstar would prevail in court, LC decided 
on July 13, 1993 to request an "owner-initiated" reexamination on its '635 patent, thus gaining for itself an 
ex parte proceeding with the US Patent Office to determine the impact of the new prior art. This 
reexamination enabled LC to re-enter negotiations with the Patent Office over the patent’s claims. If the 
USPTO upheld the suspect claims, the presumption of validity of the '635 before the court would be 
strengthened. 
 
LC was awarded its equivalent European Patent, EP 190315, on October 17, 1993. LC designated 
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and 
Sweden as states in which it intended to patent. Nexstar opposed the LC's EPO patent on April 6, 1994, 
and was joined in opposition by Daiichi Pharmaceutical Company on September 21. On December 21, 
1994, the Delaware District Court found that LC's patent was invalid and that Nexstar's product was not 
infringing. As of this date, no decision has been delivered in the Nextar / Daiichi opposition proceedings, 
thus suggesting the cases are essentially closed. 
 
Legal maneuvers kept the US litigation alive through 1995 and, on June 7, 1996 LC announced that it had 
been "upheld" by the US Patent Office in its reexamination. Company officials declared that the patent’s 
"presumption of validity [was] enhanced" and threatened Nexstar with an injunction to prevent it from 
selling AmBisome. LC shares were up 3.4% on the news that day, while Nexstar's dropped 21.5%. (Marc 
Monseau, "Patent Office upholds Liposome patent," Denver Rocky Mountain News, June 7, 1996).  
 
The news also appears to have scuttled Nexstar’s plans for a $60 million new share offering in June 1996 
that would finance the firm’s acquisition of new drugs, marketing its newest product, and research & 
development. (David Algeo, "Nexstar may kill offering," The Denver Post, D:1, June 8, 1996). Nexstar 
officer said that LC’s announcement of the outcome of its patent re-examation had harmed the firm (Jesse 
Eisinger, "Patent ruling may hamper Nexstar offering," Denver Rocky Mountain News, 5B, June 11, 
1996). 
 
The USPTO certificate on the reexamination of the ‘635 patent finally issued on July 2, 1996, and the 
facts did not entirely support LC's press releases of a month earlier. In reality, B1 Certification 2,937 
stated that 3 claims had been cancelled, 6 claims had been amended, and 19 new claims were added.   30 
Nexstar returned to federal court in May of 1997, claiming that LC had purposefully misrepresented the 
reexamination results to gain advantage and injure Nexstar, and argued that the '635 patent was invalid. 
 
EP190315 was opposed at the EPO on Feb. 1, 1994 by Nexstar and Daiichi Pharmaceutical. The case is 
still pending on appeal, and we do not know the preliminary outcome. It is probable, based on the events 
discussed immediately below, that they are not waiting for the final outcome and the case is essentially 
closed.  
  
The two competitors ultimately reached a settlement in their U.S. court case on August 11, 1997, jointly 
stipulating to a dismissal. In the settlement, LC granted Nexstar immunity from future suits in connection 
with its worldwide manufacture and marketing of AmBisome. The firms agreed to grant reciprocal 
options to take licenses to the other's patented technologies, while Nexstar agreed to unspecified 
payments to LC. The following day, Nexstar's AmBisome was approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration for marketing in the United States. 
 
Ortho Pharmaceuticals – U. S. Patent 4,363,799 (EPO Publ. No. 17381) 
 
By the early 1980s, monoclonal antibodies had been recognized as a remarkable advance in medical 
science. The discovery, which allows the identification of so-called T cell subsets of lymphocytes, a type 
of white blood cell, showed promise for enabling advancements in the treatment of infectious disease, 
cancer, infertility, autoimmune disorders, heart disease, and other maladies. In 1984, sales of diagnostics 
and therapies using the technique grossed US $500 million, with projections of annual sales of US $2 
billion by 1990 (Lawrence Altman, "A Discovery and its Impact: Nine Years of Excitement," NYT, C:3, 
Oct. 16, 1984). The founders of the technique were awarded the 1984 Nobel Prize in Medicine, signaling 
its path breaking nature. 
 
On March 20, 1979, the Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation applied for a United States patent on its 
invention entitled "Monoclonal antibody to human T cells, and methods for preparing same." On March 
19, 1980, presumably taking advantage of the 1-year application window allowed in the EPO, Ortho 
applied for its equivalent European patent, application number EP1980030082, using the US application 
date as its priority date. Based on the application’s March 1979 international priority date, the EPO 
published the application on October 15 1980, signaling the existence of the pending patent. Ortho 
designated its European states of interest on that date as Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, 
Great Britain, Holland, Italy, and Sweden. 
 
On December 14, 1982, after some 2 years and 9 months pending in the US Patent Office, the US patent 
issued (number 4,363,799), with 11 claims. Approximately two years later, on September 20, 1984, Ortho 
filed a complaint alleging patent infringement against Becton Dickinson Monoclonal Center, Inc. in the 
Federal District Court in Wilmington, Delaware. The complaint also covered 12 other patents owned by 
Ortho. Within 10 months, the European equivalent patent (No. 17381) issued, on July 10, 1985.  
 
During 1986, legal maneuvering on both sides of the Atlantic tested the validity of the Ortho patent. On 
June 4, 1986, an EPO opposition was filed by Behringwerke AG and Sandoz AG. Within a week, on June 
11, a second opposition was filed by Becton, Dickinson & Company and by Boehringer Mannheim 
GMBH. On July 24, 1986, Ortho's US infringement action against Becton Dickinson, an opponent to 
Ortho’s EPO patent, was transferred to the Federal District Court in Northern California. On September 
26, Ortho again asserted its patent in an infringement action against Coulter Corporation and Coulter 
Electronics Corporation in the Southern District of Florida.  
 
By October 3, 1986, Ortho and Becton Dickinson had settled their California litigation. Each party 
stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the case and the Court announcing that the parties had "resolved   31 
their differences." But the EPO opposition proceedings continued, and after the two pending oppositions 
were consolidated, the EPO patent was revoked on October 17, 1986. Ortho immediately appealed the 
adverse decision to the EPO, but the appeal was finally rejected on January 8, 1991, five years after 
settlement of the firm’s infringement suit against one of the EPO patent opponents. 
 
Ortho's suit against Coulter Corporation and Coulter Electronics Corporation in the Southern District of 
Florida was finally settled in November, 1993, with a consent judgment and a dismissal. Ortho's US 
patent remains in force but has not been asserted in court since. The patent number is not withdrawn, 
although the patent is close to expiration. 
 # Obs. Median IQ Range # Obs. Median IQ Range
Lag btwn application & 
grant 2022 4.78 2.15 3208 1.72 0.90
Lag btwn grant & first 
challenge 2027 0.75 0.01 3208 2.82 4.92
Lag btwn first challenge 
& final outcome 1526 2.73 2.34 3208 1.28 0.91
    
Total lag 1519 8.35 3.24 3208 6.36 5.50
Lag btwn application & 
grant 839 4.31 1.93 2188 1.79 0.92
Lag btwn grant & first 
challenge 836 0.75 0.02 2188 4.19 5.89
Lag btwn first challenge 
& final outcome 797 2.85 2.50 2188 1.28 0.96
  
Total lag 795 8.09 3.31 2188 7.90 6.46
*These numbers are for our sample of opposed patents only; only the first opposition is used.
**These numbers are for all re-examined patents (requests 1974-2000; duplicates removed).




Lags between Application, Grant, Challenge, and Final Outcome
32No. of re-
exams# Dprob/dx+ Std. Error Dprob/dx+ Std. Error   Dprob/dx+ Std. Error Dprob/dx+ Std. Error
Bio/pharma 26 -0.0175 0.0169 -0.0216 0.0171 14 -0.0229 0.0367 -0.0335 0.0337
Semiconductor/hardware 183 -0.0271 0.0070 -0.0215 0.0070 126 -0.0032 0.0143 0.0030 0.0146
Software 56 -0.0667 0.0069 -0.0645 0.0063 31 -0.0759 0.0160 -0.0782 0.0152
#cites (10yr) = 1 or 2 481 0.0550 0.0086 0.0418 0.0082 295 0.0927 0.0161 0.0846 0.0158
#cites (10yr) = 3 to 10 1240 0.1417 0.0091 0.1180 0.0086 842 0.1913 0.0143 0.1735 0.0142
#cites (10yr) = 10 to 20 668 0.3468 0.0168 0.2935 0.0165 511 0.4488 0.0228 0.4089 0.0240
#cites (10yr) > 20 469 0.5745 0.0197 0.5005 0.0216 333 0.6563 0.0218 0.6017 0.0250
#claims = 6 to 9 613 0.0167 0.0064 439 0.0278 0.0102
#claims = 10 166 0.0215 0.0105 120 0.0384 0.0171
#claims = 11 to 15 602 0.0385 0.0074 403 0.0565 0.0117
#claims >15 1228 0.0593 0.0069 774 0.1009 0.0116
#claims missing 10 -0.0672 0.0104 2 0.1172 0.1607
Individual assignee 522 0.0031 0.0053 -0.0063 0.0490 351 0.0052 0.0085 -0.0042 0.0083
Government assignee 14 -0.0798 0.0080 -0.0756 0.0071 11 -0.1100 0.0127 -0.1080 0.0121
U.S. inventor 2337 0.0540 0.0040 1566 0.0616 0.0068
Non-European developed 
country patent* 102 0.0815 0.0172 56 0.0607 0.0259
Chi-squared and p-val for 
regional dummies (df=6)   49.48 0.0000 26.07 0.0004
Pseudo R-squared
Log likelihood
Chi-squared (df)++ 1595.98 9 1965.96 16 1228.77 9 1434.03 16
The left-out category is a corporate-owned patent granted in 1975/76 with fewer than 6 claims and no citations within 10 years after grant.
#The number of re-exams that have the characteristic described.
+This is the increase in probability for a unit change to the dummy (all variables are dummy variables).
++Grant year dummies are included in all estimations; the null hypothesis is these dummies only.
*Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Israel
**Japan, Germany, Other Asia, Other W. Europe, E. Europe, Other
Table 2
0.131 0.152 0.117 0.136
All Observations (23,444; 3,078 re-exams) Patents granted before 1991 (12,160; 2,058 re-exams)
Probability of a Re-examination Request
Binary probit estimation (23,444 observations; 3,078 re-exams)
-7920.01 -7735.02 -4881.43 -4778.81
33Share
Claims NOA* Added Cancelled Add&Cancel Totals Share with any
Claims added 145  -- -- -- 145 4.6% 33.9%
Claims cancelled 181 146 -- -- 327 10.5% 35.9%
Claims amended 466 371 397 399 1633 52.2% 52.2%
No change 734 -- -- -- 734 23.5% 30.7%
Patent cancelled 288 -- -- -- 288 9.2% 9.2%
Total 1814 517 397 399 3127 100.0%
Share
Claims NOA* Added Cancelled Add&Cancel Totals Share with any
Claims added 11  -- -- -- 11 4.2% 28.5%
Claims cancelled 19 4 -- -- 23 8.7% 31.6%
Claims amended 53 30 30 30 143 54.4% 54.4%
No change 56 -- -- -- 56 21.3% 23.8%
Patent cancelled 30 -- -- -- 30 11.4% 11.4%
Total 169 34 30 30 263 100.0%
*NOA=no other action noted
***Of 268 records, 263 (98.1%) have outcome notations.
Each re-exam appears only once. 
Numbers in the last column do not add to 100% because some re-exams yield multiple outcomes. 
In the cases where there is more than one re-examination request, only the final outcome is shown. 
There are 306 multiple requests; only the final outcome is included in this table. 
**Of 3208 records, 3127 (97.5%) have outcome notations
All technologies**
Table 3
Reexamination outcomes, 1981-2000 (Patents granted 1975-1999)
with
Biotech/pharma and Semiconductors/computer hardware & software***
with
34No. of obs
equal to 1 Dprob/dx+ Std. Error Dprob/dx+ Std. Error
EPO characteristics
Biotech/pharma technology 2,157 0.159 0.020 ***
No. of forward EPO cites = 1 974 0.060 0.022 *** 0.064 0.023 ***
No. of forward EPO cites = 2/5 1,311 0.163 0.021 *** 0.173 0.021 ***
No. of forward EPO cites = 6/10 258 0.229 0.035 *** 0.224 0.036 ***
No. of forward EPO cites >10 80 0.400 0.051 *** 0.418 0.050 ***
No. of designated states 6-10  1,082 0.137 0.022 *** 0.128 0.023 ***
No. of designated states >10  1,733 0.175 0.024 *** 0.169 0.025 ***
No. of EPO claims 6-9  1,192 0.015 0.024 0.010 0.025
No. of EPO claims = 10  580 0.044 0.030 0.022 0.030
No. of EPO claims 11-15  1,068 0.051 0.026 ** 0.033 0.026
No. of EPO claims >15 1,244 0.118 0.026 *** 0.105 0.026 ***
Independent inventor (EPO ass.) 220 0.028 0.036 0.016 0.036
Accelerated search requested  86 -0.136 0.054 ** -0.140 0.054 **
Accelerated exam requested  140 0.243 0.045 *** 0.240 0.046 ***
PCT application  937 0.122 0.023 *** 0.131 0.024 ***
Nationality of patentholder
U. S. 1,642 -0.012 0.049  0.000 0.049
Germany 713 0.101 0.053 * 0.096 0.053 *
Other West European 1,240 0.075 0.050 0.072 0.050
Japan 1,154 0.042 0.051 0.045 0.051
Chi-squared (4) for region dummies *** ***
Chi-squared (2) for US,JP *
US Twin characteristics
US Twin exists 2,893 -0.089 0.016 *** -0.094 0.016 ***
More than one US twin 95
No. of US forward cites = 1 or 2 571
No. of US forward cites = 3/10 1,327
No. of US forward cites = 10/20 512
No. of US forward cites >20 271
No. of US claims 6-9  751
No. of US claims = 10  157
No. of US claims 11-15  555
No. of US claims >15 846
US app. date prior to EPO  1,495




+This is the increase in probability for a unit change to the dummy.
++One of the dummies predicts opposition perfectly, so the increase in degrees of freedom is only 12 = 13-1.
All equations include a complete set of 18 grant year dummies.
The left-out category is a corporate patent in semiconductor/software with number of states <6, number of claims <6, zero forward cites, 
    and with holder from a country other than the "triad."
Table 4 (part 1)
Probability of an Opposition









35Dprob/dx+ Std. Error Dprob/dx+ Std. Error
EPO characteristics
Biotech/pharma technology 0.165 0.020 *** 0.181 0.020 ***
No. of forward EPO cites = 1 0.063 0.022 *** 0.053 0.023 **
No. of forward EPO cites = 2/5 0.168 0.021 *** 0.144 0.021 ***
No. of forward EPO cites = 6/10 0.236 0.035 *** 0.194 0.037 ***
No. of forward EPO cites >10 0.397 0.051 *** 0.365 0.056 ***
No. of designated states 6-10  0.129 0.022 *** 0.130 0.022 ***
No. of designated states >10  0.165 0.024 *** 0.164 0.024 ***
No. of EPO claims >15 0.084 0.018 *** 0.074 0.019 ***
Accelerated search requested  -0.132 0.055 ** -0.132 0.055 **
Accelerated exam requested  0.242 0.045 *** 0.239 0.046 ***
PCT application  0.119 0.023 *** 0.100 0.023 ***
Nationality of patentholder
Germany 0.091 0.023 *** 0.091 0.024 ***
Other West European 0.068 0.018 *** 0.069 0.020 ***
US Twin characteristics
US Twin exists -0.088 0.016 *** -0.141 0.038 ***
More than one US twin 0.007 0.055  
No. of US forward cites = 1 or 2 0.008 0.040
No. of US forward cites = 3/10 0.090 0.036 **
No. of US forward cites = 10/20 0.171 0.042 ***
No. of US forward cites >20 0.180 0.048 ***
No. of US claims 6-9  -0.025 0.028
No. of US claims = 10  0.000 0.027
No. of US claims 11-15  -0.071 0.045
No. of US claims >15 -0.037 0.029
US app. date prior to EPO  -0.041 0.021 *




Chi-squared for US patent vars. 42.6 11 ***
Table 4 (part 2)
Probability of an Opposition
Binary probit estimation (4868 observations; 2021 opposed)
-2848.92













Opposition rejected 266 173 65.0%
Opposition rejected on appeal 85 47 55.3%
Opposition rejected - total 351 220 62.7% 17.4% 21.4%
 
Patent amended 355 207 58.3%
Patent amended on appeal 163 81 49.7%
Patent amended - total 518 288 55.6% 25.6% 28.0%
 
Patent revoked 366 181 49.5%
Patent revoked on appeal 184 92 50.0%
Patent revoked - total 550 273 49.6% 27.2% 26.6%
 
Opposition closed  150 81 54.0% 7.4% 7.9%
Opposition case pending 190 72 37.9%
Appeals case pending 262 94 35.9%
Case pending - total 452 166 36.7% 22.4% 16.1%
 









Opposition rejected - total 351 22.4% 19.1% 26.8% 25.5%
Patent amended - total 518 33.0% 38.1% 26.1% 33.4%
Patent revoked - total 550 35.1% 31.5% 40.0% 31.7%
Opposition closed  150 9.6% 11.3% 7.1% 9.4%
Total with an outcome 1569 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Opposition pending 452 22.4% 27.7% 13.6% 16.1%
Total 2021
Table 5
























Biotech/pharma -2.9% 1.7% 10.3% 1.4% -10.5% -3.9% 2.8% 11.7% 0.6% -11.2%
EPO Citations 6/10 -3.2% 3.0% 5.5% -0.6% -4.6%
EPO Citations >10 -15.5% 14.1% 11.3% 4.7% -14.6% -14.6% 12.6% 11.1% 3.9% -13.0%
Designated states 6/10 -1.1% 3.9% 1.1% -1.0% -2.9%
Designated states >10 -0.2% 8.2% -3.9% -0.5% -3.7% 0.6% 5.7% -5.0% 0.4% -1.7%
No. of EPO claims 6-9  -1.7% -3.9% 7.4% -2.4% 0.6%
No. of EPO claims = 10  -5.1% -2.4% 8.2% -5.5% 4.8%
No. of EPO claims 11-15  -2.3% -5.4% 13.2% -4.4% -1.0% -0.2% -2.7% 8.1% -2.2% -3.0%
No. of EPO claims >15 -2.5% -1.0% 13.5% -0.8% -9.2% -0.4% 2.1% 8.4% 1.4% -11.5%
Accelerated search requested 4.5% 0.8% 3.7% 1.8% -10.8%
Accelerated exam requested -5.4% 5.2% 7.3% -1.0% -6.2% -5.3% 5.3% 7.3% -0.7% -6.6%
PCT filing -2.6% 2.4% -0.2% 1.3% -0.9%
US patentholder 2.4% -0.2% 2.0% -3.1% -1.1%
German patentholder 7.0% -2.5% -1.3% -4.1% 0.9% 6.5% -2.3% -2.6% -2.7% 1.1%
Japanese patentholder -0.3% -1.4% 10.5% -5.1% -3.7% -0.6% -2.3% 9.1% -3.5% -2.7%
Same patent & opposer country  -2.2% -3.2% 4.1% 5.0% -3.8% -2.1% -3.1% 4.4% 4.9% -4.1%
Multiple oppositions -10.7% 9.6% -6.4% -10.3% 17.9% -10.9% 10.1% -5.8% -10.6% 17.3%
US twin exists 4.2% -1.6% 3.2% 1.8% -7.6% 4.8% -1.7% 3.2% 1.5% -7.8%
Multiple US twins 1.1% 5.5% 2.8% -1.0% -8.4% 0.6% 5.4% 2.8% -0.3% -8.5%
USPTO - Indep. Inventor 7.2% 0.2% -3.8% -0.6% -3.1%
Entries in bold are significantly different from the rejection effects at the 5 percent level. 
Entries in bold italics are significantly different from the rejection effects at the 10 percent level. 
Bi-annual year dummies are included.
Only one (final) outcome per EPO patent included. 
Change in Probability Going from Dummy=0 to Dummy=1 (#obs.) Change in Probability Going from Dummy=0 to Dummy=1 (#obs.)
Table 6
Multinomial Logit for Opposition Outcomes
2,021 Observations
38Figure 1
Patent Application Patent Application
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EPO oppositions (left hand scale)
USPTO re-exams adjusted for truncation (right hand scale)Figure 3
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Lag between Application and Final Re-examination Outcome 





























Lag between Application and Final Opposition Outcome
Biotech/pharma/semiconductor/software classes only











































BP – 519 (41.1%)
SS - 513 (67.1%)




BP – 459 (50.8%)
SS-1,486 (75.9%)
Total – 1,945 (68.0%)
44Figure 7



























All opposed patents Opposed patents with US twins Opposed patents litigated in US